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Abstract 
This paper examines whether methodological deficiencies in the literature on 
discrimination in small business credit markets have a significant impact on the estimation of 
discrimination and provides a preliminary investigation into the causes of discrimination in these 
markets. We find substantial, statistically significant evidence of discrimination in loan approval 
against black-owned and Hispanic-owned businesses in 1998 with additional control variables, 
with a variety of different specifications, and with a simultaneous model of the application and 
loan-denial decisions. We also find that discrimination in small business lending may take the 
form of statistical discrimination, driven by lenders’ stereotypes about the ability of black- and 
Hispanic-owned businesses to succeed under some circumstances. In addition, we find that 
neither adding additional control variables nor accounting for possible endogeneity alters the 
conclusion that there is no discrimination in interest rates on approved loans. We also find, 
however, that black-owned businesses do face discrimination in interest rates when they deal 
with some types of lenders, particularly finance companies. Because finance companies 
specialize in higher-risk borrowers, this finding might indicate that they are willing to consider 
group-membership as a risk predictor despite the illegality of this practice. These findings 
suggest that federal financial regulatory agencies should re-double their efforts to uncover and 
prosecute lenders who discriminate against black- and Hispanic-owned businesses.  
 
 
 
 
We are grateful for financial support from the Ewing Kauffman Foundation and for 
helpful comments from Tim Bates, Dan Black, David Blanchflower, Alicia Robb, and 
John Wolken. 
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Introduction 
Businesses owned by members of racial and ethnic minority groups and by women make 
up a growing share of the American economy (Olson 2005). These firms are younger and smaller 
than white- and male-owned firms, however, and may be more susceptible to swings in market 
conditions (Bates 1999).1 To the extent that these firms face barriers accessing credit, their 
disadvantage in the marketplace is exacerbated. Several recent studies find evidence that 
minority- and women-owned businesses face discrimination in loan approval and interest rates 
(Blanchflower, Levine, and Zimmerman 2003; Bostic and Lampani 1999; Cavalluzzo, 
Cavalluzzo, and Wolken 2002; Cavalluzzo and Wolken 2002; Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo 1998; 
and Bates 1991, 1997). This paper reviews and extends this literature.  
Studies of lending discrimination must address biases from four sources: omitting 
relevant explanatory variables, sample selection, endogeneity, and misspecification (Ross and 
Yinger 2002). Our contribution to the literature on discrimination in small-business lending is to 
improve existing methods for dealing with the first and last sources of bias and to address the 
endogeneity issue for the first time. Looking ahead, we find that addressing these methodological 
challenges has little impact on estimated discrimination using the 1998 and 1993 Surveys of 
Small Business Finances (SSBF). In addition, we provide some new evidence on the causes of 
discrimination in small business lending.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
Types of Discrimination 
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 (ECOA), as amended, prohibits discrimination 
“against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction.” ECOA assigns 
enforcement authority to the federal financial institutions responsible for overseeing various sets 
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of lenders. A manual published by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
(FFIEC undated, p. i) explains that ECOA “applies to any extension of credit, including 
extensions of credit to small businesses.”2 
The FFIEC manual also explains the three methods that courts recognize as proof of 
discrimination. The first two, overt and comparative evidence, fall within the category of 
“disparate treatment.” Disparate-treatment discrimination can be proven by statements revealing 
that a lender explicitly considers prohibited factors (overt evidence) or by across-group 
differences in treatment that are not fully explained by legitimate factors (comparative evidence). 
The third method is providing evidence of “disparate impact.” If a lender applies a 
race/ethnicity-neutral or gender-neutral policy or practice that disproportionately excludes 
members of these protected classes, this policy or practice is said to have a “disparate impact.” 
Whenever one of the federal financial regulatory agencies finds evidence of disparate impact, 
then the lender must show that the relevant lending policies or practices are justified by 
“business necessity,” that is, whether they have a legitimate business purpose. If not, or if non-
discriminatory alternatives for attaining the same business objectives are available, the policies 
or practices are said to involve disparate-impact discrimination and are illegal.  
The Loan-Denial Decision 
A lender’s objective is to approve loan applications that provide a higher return than 
other potential uses of the capital. In practice, however, a loan officer may have only a rough 
idea of a loan’s contribution to his employer’s profitability, and approve/deny decisions are often 
made using rule of thumb. Following Ross and Yinger (2002), we define π as the profit 
contribution of a loan as determined by the best possible prediction using full information and 
the most appropriate statistical procedure, and π* as the lender’s required level of profitability. A 
lender would like to select loans using the following rule: 
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*
*
Approve if:
Deny if:
π π
π π
≥
<  (1) 
Because they typically have incomplete information and use a less-than-ideal statistical method 
or even a non-statistical rule of thumb, however, loan officers actually base their decisions on a 
rough prediction of profitability, labeled πΕ, not on π. This rough prediction is based on the 
information available to the loan officer concerning the creditworthiness of the applicant and the 
business activity, including the owner’s credit and resources (C), the firm’s credit and financial 
health (F), and the environment in which the firm and lender operate (N). Thus, the lender’s 
actual decision rule is: 
  
 
*
*
Approve if: ( , , )
Deny if: ( , , )
E
E
C F N
C F N
π π
π π
≥
<  (2) 
The parameters of equation (2) can be estimated using a probit model in which D is a zero-one 
variable that indicates when a loan application is denied and Φ refers to the cumulative density 
function of a normal distribution. In symbols: 
 
 0Pr[ 1] ( )i C i F i N iD C F Nα α α α= = Φ + + +  (3) 
 
Discrimination exists when race/ethnicity or gender has an independent impact on the 
lender's approve/deny decision after controlling for the impact of C, F, and N on loan 
profitability. Disparate-treatment discrimination exists when a lender uses different rules for 
different groups, that is, when group membership, M, is an argument in the πΕ  function.3 
Disparate-treatment discrimination would exist, for example, if the net-worth threshold required 
for loan approval were higher for women applicants than for male applicants, all else equal. 
Disparate-impact discrimination exists when differences between the best-possible profitability 
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prediction, π, and the actual profitability prediction, πΕ , place people in a legally protected class 
at a disadvantage. Suppose, for example, that the profitability of a loan is not related to the 
number of previous contacts a lender has had with an applicant, but that some lender considers 
this factor in approving a loan; that is, suppose the number of previous contacts is in πΕ  but not 
in π. Now if applicants from minority groups have relatively infrequent contacts with this lender, 
they will, on average, be placed at a disadvantage for a reason unjustified by business necessity. 
This is disparate-impact discrimination. 
The standard approach to estimating discrimination is to include the minority-status 
variable, M, in the equation (3), that is, to estimate 
 
 0Pr[ 1] ( )i C i F i N i iD C F N Mα α α α β= = Φ + + + +  (4) 
 
If all relevant credit variables are included in the regression, the regression is properly specified, 
and all lenders use the same underwriting standards, then β provides an estimate of disparate-
treatment discrimination. Even if these three conditions are met, this approach does not yield an 
estimate of disparate-impact discrimination. In fact, disparate-impact discrimination that is built 
into the average underwriting standards and therefore reflected in the estimated α coefficients 
cannot be detected by this method. This type of disparate-impact discrimination cannot be 
detected without data on loan performance (see Ross and Yinger 2002).  
All three of the above conditions are critical. The omission of variables that are observed 
by the lender, predict profitability, and are correlated with minority status results in a biased 
estimate of β. One legacy of our nation’s discriminatory past is that creditworthiness is 
negatively correlated with minority status, so omitted credit characteristics are likely to bias the 
estimate of β upward. This may be a particularly severe problem in the case of small business 
lending. As the FFIEC manual (undated, p. 24) puts it: “Unlike consumer credit, where loan 
products and prices are generally homogenous and underwriting involves the evaluation of a 
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limited number of credit variables, commercial loans are generally unique and underwriting 
methods and loan pricing may vary depending on a large number of credit variables.” Thus, a 
credible estimate of discrimination must include a wide range of underwriting variables in the 
loan-denial regression. 
 Second, the loan-denial equation must be correctly specified, that is, it must accurately 
describe a lender’s underwriting standards. In the case of mortgage lending, for example, several 
studies find that the weights, i.e., estimated coefficients, for the underwriting variables depend on 
the applicant’s debt-to-income ratio or on consumer credit history (Ross and Yinger 2002). A 
failure to recognize this type of interaction or other non-linearities in underwriting standards 
could lead to biased estimates of β. 
Third, the estimate of β also may be biased upward when all lenders do not use the same 
underwriting standards. As explained by Blackburn and Vermilyea (2001), Buist, Linneman, and 
Megbolugbe (1999), Courchane, Nebhut, and Nickerson (2000), and Stengel and Glennon (1999) 
for the case of mortgage loans, β can reflect deviations from average underwriting standards that 
are correlated with M. If these deviations are justified on the basis of business necessity, then β is 
likely to overstate discrimination.4 If these deviations are not justified on the basis of business 
necessity, however, then they lead to disparate-impact discrimination which is, appropriately, 
included in M. The key, therefore, is to separate these two explanations. 
Ross and Yinger (2002) argue that legitimate variation in underwriting standards, that is, 
variation associated with business necessity, must be linked with variation in the pool of 
businesses from which applications to a lender are drawn. If two lenders receive applications 
drawn from the same pool, then they face the same underlying π function and have no 
justification for differences in underwriting standards—at least not for differences that lead to 
inter-group disparities in loan approval. According to this argument, a researcher can control for 
legitimate variation in underwriting standards by allowing the weights (i.e., estimated 
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coefficients) of underwriting variables to vary with loan and lender characteristics that are likely 
to be correlated with the type of applications a lender attracts. 
This approach provides the most accurate estimate of discrimination that is possible 
without loan-performance data, but it does not eliminate all possible biases (Ross and Yinger 
2002). If the variation in underwriting standards correlated with the type of lender and the 
purposes of the loan does not help to predict loan profitability, then this approach may understate 
discrimination. It is also true, however, that this approach may overstate discrimination if 
underwriting standards vary across lenders in ways that predict loan profitability but are not 
correlated with the type of lender or the purpose of the loan. Results based on this approach, 
including those presented below, must be interpreted with these possibilities in mind.  
Finally, a full analysis of the loan-denial decision must also consider the demand side. A 
small firm must decide whether to apply for a loan and, if it does, how large it would like the 
loan to be. As pointed out by Cavalluzzo et al. (2002), this behavior complicates an analysis of 
the loan-denial decision because some small firms may decide not to apply in the belief that they 
will be turned down.5 This is an example of a selection problem: the set of applications in the 
sample is self-selected partly on the basis of the dependent variable, or at least potential 
applicants’ predictions about the dependent variable, so that the estimated coefficients may be 
biased. A method to deal with this problem, namely to estimate the application and denial 
decisions simultaneously, was developed by Bloom, Preiss, and Trussell (1983) for the mortgage 
market and has been applied to small business lending by Cavalluzzo et al. 
The Interest-Rate Decision 
No analysis of discrimination in small business lending would be complete without 
examining lenders’ decisions about interest rates. After all, a lender might accept loans on a non-
discriminatory basis but then set higher interest rates for small businesses owned by minorities or 
women than for equivalent small businesses owned by white men.6 We test for discrimination by 
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determining whether interest rates differ by group membership after controlling for C, F, N, and 
other loan characteristics, L. These other loan characteristics, which include whether the interest 
rate is fixed or variable, whether collateral is required and the type of collateral, are determined 
at the same time as the interest rate and therefore may be endogenous.7 In symbols, our interest-
rate model is 
 ( , , , , )I I C F N L M=  (5) 
Literature Review 
One well-known study based on Boston area data for 1990, Munnell et al. (1996), 
estimates that the mortgage loan applications of black and Hispanic home seekers are 82 percent 
more likely to be rejected than are the applications of equally qualified whites. Several 
subsequent studies have examined the same data, and the finding of discrimination is remarkably 
robust (Ladd 1998; Ross and Yinger 2002). Other studies find discrimination in mortgage 
lenders’ pre-approval behavior (Turner et al. 2003). In this section we review the related 
literature on discrimination in small business lending, with a focus on existing approaches to the 
methodological problems identified in section II. 
In small-business lending, black-owned firms consistently have been found to be 26 to 36 
percentage points more likely to be denied access to credit (Blanchflower et al. 2003; Cavalluzzo 
and Wolken 2002; Cavalluzzo et al. 2002; Bostic and Lampani 1999), while Hispanic- and 
Asian-owned firms in 1998 have been found to be 22 and 13 percentage points more likely to be 
denied credit, respectively (Blanchflower et al. 2003; Cavalluzzo and Wolken 2002). These 
studies also find inter-group differences in interest rates in some cases.  
Omitted Variables 
Existing studies have identified a large number of credit variables in the SSBF data sets 
and included them in their loan-denial and interest-rate regressions. Blanchflower et al. (2003), 
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for example, analyze loan denial and 1998 SSBF data controlling for credit history; credit score; 
the firm’s market scale, age, number of employees, and legal status; characteristics of the loan; 
the owner’s education and wealth; and industry, region, and year. They use a similar set of 
variables without credit score in their analysis of the 1993 data. Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) examine 
loan denial in the 1993 SSBF using an extensive set of explanatory variables similar to the ones 
in Blanchflower et al. Cavalluzzo et al. also control for the level of concentration in the banking 
industry using the well-known Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  
Bostic and Lampani (1999) argue that omitting local geographic characteristics, which 
are often correlated with race and ethnicity, may bias discrimination estimates. By appending 
data from the 1990 Census and annual Call Reports to the 1993 SSBF, they control for the 
poverty rate, median housing value, unemployment rate, housing vacancy rate, median 
household size, population, median household income, average education, and racial/ethnic mix 
by ZIP Codes. One of their local geography variables, a dummy variable indicating whether the 
ratio of the median housing value in the ZIP code to the MSA was less than 0.80, was 
statistically significant. Including these extra controls does not have a significant impact on 
estimates of discrimination, but it does raise the standard errors and results in a discrimination 
estimate that is significant only at the 10 percent threshold.  
Specification 
Existing studies of discrimination in small-business lending explore several possible non-
linearities in underwriting standards. Blanchflower et al. (2003), for example, recognize that it 
may be inappropriate to assume linearity in the impact of previous credit problems; “one might 
suspect,” they say, “that the marginal impact would rise as credit problems rise” (p. 939).8 Thus, 
they estimate separate loan-denial models for (a) proprietorships and partnerships versus 
corporations, (b) young firms and old firms, (c) small firms and large firms, (d) loans for 
working capital and other loans (1993 only), (e) firms selling in a local market and a regional, 
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national, or international market, (f) applicants with and without past credit problems, and (g) 
firms with a high or low credit rating (1998 only).  
The estimate of discrimination against blacks is statistically significant in every case 
except one (large firms in 1998) and the estimated magnitude of discrimination against blacks is 
similar in the two subsamples in almost every case. The results for Hispanics are more mixed, 
but the estimates of discrimination against Hispanics are similar in the two samples in many 
cases. Both blacks and Hispanics, for example, face discrimination even if they do not have any 
previous credit problems.  
Self-Selection 
As noted earlier, Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) address the issue of self-selection using the 
1993 SSBF and the technique developed by Bloom et al. (1983). They add observations for firms 
that did not apply for a loan and therefore do not appear in the denial models. Then they use a 
bivariate probit model to estimate the application and denial equations simultaneously. They find 
a significant correlation between the two equations (ρ = -0.49), which is a sign of self-selection, 
but they also find that adding the selection equation results in estimates of discrimination that are 
very similar to those obtained from a single-equation model.  
The Interest Rate Equation 
Blanchflower et al. (2003) and Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) both analyze inter-group 
differences in interest rates, controlling for most of the same variables that are in the loan-denial 
regressions. Both studies use OLS, however, and therefore assume that loan characteristics other 
than interest rate were exogenous to the interest rate decision. Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) find that 
the black-white difference in interest rates is not significant, whereas Blanchflower et al. (2003) 
find that it is. Specifically, Blanchflower et al. find that in 1993 black-owned firms paid 98 to 
122 basis points (i.e., about one percentage point) more in interest than equally qualified white-
owned firms. Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) do not find evidence of discrimination in interest rates 
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against Hispanic-owned firms, whereas Blanchflower et al. (2003) find a significant difference, 
about 50 basis points, between Hispanic-owned and white-owned firms in 1993 and a significant 
difference, 85 basis points, between Asian-owned and white-owned firms in 1998. These results 
may all be biased because of the endogeneity of other loan terms.  
The Causes of Discrimination in Business Lending 
The literature on mortgage lending discrimination suggests that discrimination in small 
business lending may have two different causes.9 First, following Becker (1971), some lenders 
may be prejudiced against applicants in certain groups and therefore be more likely to turn down 
applications from people in these groups than from people in other groups who are, according to 
the lender’s underwriting standards, equally qualified. 
Second, some lenders may use membership in certain groups as an indicator for certain 
credit characteristics that cannot be observed. A lender who denies loans to people in historically 
disadvantaged groups under the assumption that people in these groups have poor unobserved 
credit qualifications is practicing “statistical discrimination.” Even if it is profitable, however, 
“[t]his behavior is illegal—under the pertinent laws, a lender must base his or her decision on the 
observed credit characteristics of an applicant—but some lenders may respond to the economic 
incentive instead of to the requirements of the law” (Ross and Yinger 2002, p. 214, emphasis in 
original). Evidence for statistical discrimination has been found for other markets, including the 
housing market (Ondrich, Ross, and Yinger, 2003).  
Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) and Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2002) argue, based on Becker 
(1971), that competition will eliminate discrimination motivated by prejudice and test this 
hypothesis by interacting the group membership variables with HHI.10 In their initial analysis, 
for example, Cavalluzzo et al. estimate that in competitive banking markets, white-owned and 
black-owned firms faced denial probabilities of 32 percent and 39 percent, respectively—a 7 
point difference. In concentrated banking markets, the probability of denial fell to 27 percent for 
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white-owned firms and climbed to 55 percent for black-owned firms—a 28-point difference. 
They also find, however, that black-owned firms are less likely to apply for credit in less 
competitive markets, and when they control for this (using the selection model discussed earlier), 
the HHI interaction term for black-owned businesses is no longer statistically significant. 
Although this is an appealing approach, several studies have shown that competition 
cannot be expected to eliminate prejudice-based discrimination in lending (Longhofer and Peters 
2005; Ferguson and Peters 2000). Moreover, as pointed out by Ross and Yinger (2002), 
competition may change underwriting weights, as well as the treatment of applicants in certain 
groups. This possibility is not considered in the Calvalluzzo et al. (2002) analysis. 
Data 
Our analysis uses the 1998 and 1993 SSBF. As the literature has recognized, estimates of 
discrimination in loan denial in these two years are not comparable because the 1993 survey 
asked about both new loans and extensions of old loans, not just about new loans as in 1998. To 
simplify our presentation and to focus on new loans, the text concentrates on the 1998 results and 
some of the key results from 1993 are presented in footnotes.11 
Table 1 provides definitions and Table 2 presents summary statistics for key variables in 
the 1998 data, weighted to provide estimates for the U.S. population. Table 2 shows that the 
1998 sample includes 3,561 firms, 78.8 percent white-owned, 7.7 percent black-owned, 6.9  
percent Hispanic-owned, and 6.7  percent owned by other racial/ethnic groups. The 1997 Survey 
of Minority- and Women-Owned Business Enterprises, which keeps statistics on the population 
of minority business, reports that 4 percent of all businesses are black-owned, 5.8 percent 
Hispanic-owned, and 5.3 percent owned by members of other races/ethnicities. 
The differences between these two data sets may be due to the over-sampling of 
minorities in the SSBF, but they are not large enough to raise concern over the SSBF’s 
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representation of the nation’s small businesses. Bates (1999) argues that the SSBF is not 
representative of minority-owned small businesses because the average age of the minority firms 
in the SSBF is four to five years older than the average reported by the Census Bureau. This 
possibility does not appear to be a source of bias in our estimates; Blanchflower et al. (2003) find 
no significant differences in discrimination against younger and older minority-owned firms. 
Table 2 also shows that while minority business owners are as likely to apply for credit as 
white business owners, they are more likely to be denied credit and they pay higher interest rates. 
Blacks are 43 percentage points more likely than white men to be denied credit, Hispanics 33 
points more likely, and other races 22 points more likely. We also find that blacks paid 0.63 
percentage points more than the average white, male interest rate of 9.23 percent, while 
Hispanics and other races paid 0.87 and 1.27 percentage points more, respectively. These 
differences may be explained, of course, by differences in credit history, firm and owner 
characteristics, and other relevant factors. Table 2 also shows that these other factors vary with 
race/ethnicity. These large differences do not appear in a comparison of businesses owned by 
white men and women; firms owned by white women have only a slightly higher denial rate and 
actually have interest rates that are 0.34 percentage points lower. 
Table 2 uses five mutually exclusive racial/ethnic/gender categories: African American, 
Hispanic, Asian or Native American or Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic white woman, and non-
Hispanic white man. The SSBF data set does not include enough minority women or enough 
black Hispanics to include them as separate categories. We include the few (4 in 1998) black 
Hispanics in the data in the African-American category. This grouping differs from the one in 
Blanchflower et al. (2003), who combine Hispanic women and non-Hispanic white women in 
one category. An alternative approach is to define a category for women (of any race/ethnicity) 
and to allow an applicant to be in more than one category. We use the first approach, but the 
results are similar with this alternative approach.  
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Following the approach used by the Census in the 2002 Survey of Business Owners, we 
classify a business in a particular category if more than 50 percent of it is owned by people in 
that category. This definition differs slightly from the one in Blanchflower et al. (2003), who 
include firms with exactly 50 percent minority ownership in the minority-owned category.12 
Because few firms are exactly at this boundary, regression results are virtually identical with 
either definition. 
Finally, a few firms were dropped from the analysis because they reported that their loan 
applications were sometimes approved and sometimes denied.13 Only 83 firms were in this 
category in 1998 (and none in 1993), and excluding them has virtually no impact on our results.  
Results 
Our objective is to estimate disparate-treatment discrimination in loan denial and interest 
rates using the best methodology possible with available data. We also ask whether the 
methodological deficiencies discussed above bias previous estimates of β in a significant way.  
Loan Denial: Basic Results  
Table 3 presents our results from the loan denial analysis using the 1998 SSBF. The 
entries in the table are mean marginal effects with their standard errors and p-values. Following 
Blanchflower et al. (2003), we estimate baseline probabilities that race/ethnicity and gender 
alone influence loan denial, and then successively control for other factors that are likely to 
influence the loan-denial decision. Each row is a separate unweighted regression, and only the βs 
and robust standard errors are reported.14 The first row shows that with no controls blacks, 
Hispanics, and members of other races face a 43, 33, and 15 percent higher chance of being 
denied business credit, respectively, compared to white men (the omitted category), which 
closely mirrors the differences in Table 2. The small difference in denials between white-
women-owned and white-male-owned firms is not significant at the 5 percent level. 
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The other rows in the table provide the results with successive introduction of controls for 
the applicant’s credit history and credit rating, characteristics of the firm, characteristics of the 
firm’s owner, characteristics of the loan, characteristics of the lender, geographical variables, and 
application year dummies. The specific variables in each category are listed in Table 1. Not 
surprisingly, adding controls usually lowers the estimated inter-group differences. With all 
controls added (Model (8) in Table 3), black-owned and Hispanics-owned firms face a 
probability of denial that is 17 and 15 percent, respectively, higher than the probability for firms 
owned by white males.15 These differences are highly significant statistically. The probability of 
loan-denial is not significantly higher for firms owned by other races or by white women than for 
white-male-owned firms. 
Omitted Variable Bias 
The results in Table 3 include all the controls in Blanchflower et al. (2003), but we have 
also added several additional control variables to further minimize the possibility of omitted 
variable bias. First, small businesses owned by members of a protected class may tend to select 
certain types of lenders or to apply for loans for certain purposes. If so, and if approval rates vary 
by lender type or loan purpose, then unbiased estimates of discrimination require controls for 
these factors. Thus, indicators of loan purpose and whether the lender is a commercial bank, 
savings bank and loan association, finance company, or something else are included in Models 
(5) and (6).16  
Second, because lenders may have a policy that directs them to consider loans to 
businesses within its service area more favorably than those outside this area, we include a 
dummy variable indicating whether the lender was in the same area as the firm (Petersen and 
Rajan 2000). Third, given the importance of the relationship between the lender and applicant, 
we also include the number of months the lender has worked with firm (Berger and Udell 1995; 
and Petersen and Rajan 1994).17 
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Even with the addition of these new controls blacks and Hispanics are significantly more 
likely to be denied a loan than are white males. Nevertheless, our estimate of these denial gaps is 
considerably smaller than the estimate provided by Blanchflower et al. (2003). To be specific, 
Blanchflower et al. estimate that denial gap facing blacks drops from 38.2 percentage points to 
30.1 percentage points when all their controls are added. We find a much larger drop, from 43.1 
to 17.3 percentage points. In the case of Hispanics, Blanchflower et al. estimate that the gap 
drops from 31.4 percentage points to 21.5 points, whereas we estimate that it drops from 33.0 to 
14.7 points. The question is whether our additional controls account for these differences. 
To answer this question, we begin by trying to replicate the Blanchflower et al. results 
and then to examine the impact on estimated denial gaps of all known differences between the 
two studies. We conclude that our additional control variables explain 29.7 percent of the 
difference in black-white denial gaps between the two studies. In contrast, removing these 
variables from our analysis actually widens the difference in Hispanic-nonHispanic gaps 
between the two studies by 27.9 percent. We conclude that the differences between our results 
and those of Blanchflower et al. are largely due to things other than our additional control 
variables. The main difference, which accounts for roughly half the difference for both blacks 
and Hispanics, is an esoteric one. As is customary with probit models, both studies present 
marginal effects, not regression coefficients. Blanchflower et al. present marginal effects at the 
mean value of the explanatory variables, whereas we present mean marginal effects in the 
sample. Although both measures are valid, we believe that the mean marginal effect is a more 
appealing measure of impact in a heterogeneous sample. Other factors that help explain the 
differences in the results include the differences in group definition discussed earlier, minor 
differences in the definitions of other variables, and minor differences in the sample.18 
We cannot prove, of course, that we have controlled for every credit variable that lenders 
consider in evaluating applications for business loans. The SSBF data make it possible to control 
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for a very wide range of such variables, thereby greatly lowering the probability that our 
estimates are affected by omitted variable bias. As a result, we believe that our results provide 
credible, but not airtight, estimates of discrimination.  
Specification 
We consider two principal specification issues. The first is whether estimates of 
discrimination are affected by nonlinearities in underwriting standards. The second is whether 
estimates of discrimination change when one accounts for the possibility that lenders may 
legitimately use different underwriting standards for applications from different pools of 
businesses. We address these issues using the strategy developed by Blanchflower et al. (2003), 
namely, by examining regressions based on split samples. 
As discussed earlier, nonlinearities may arise because the impact of many underwriting 
variables is different for applicants with strong credit credentials than for applicants with weak 
credit credentials. Blanchflower et al. (2003) addressed this possibility with split-sample 
regressions based on both past credit problems and credit ratings. As shown in Table 4, we 
expand this analysis by considering split-sample regressions based on firm net worth, owner’s 
housing wealth, and owner’s non-housing wealth. We find significant discrimination against 
black-owned and Hispanic-owned firms in every one of these split sample tests. The 
discrimination does not always appear in both samples, however. The regression for firms with 
high net worth finds no discrimination against black-owned firms, for example. Moreover, the 
regressions for high-wealth owners, based on either housing wealth or non-housing wealth, 
indicate higher discrimination against Hispanics than do the regressions for low-wealth owners. 
Nonlinearities also might arise for other reasons, such as firm age or firm size, both of 
which are examined by Blanchflower et al. (2003). We consider several additional possibilities, 
namely, the length of the relationship between the lender and the applicant, the purpose of the 
loan, and the amount requested. Again we find that accounting for these potential nonlinearities 
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also does not alter the conclusion that discrimination exists. More specifically, Table 4 reveals 
significant discrimination against black-owned and Hispanic-owned firms in the regression for 
firms that have long relationships (greater than three years) with the lender, in the regressions for 
both types of loan purpose, and in the regression for small loans (less than $50,000). In addition, 
black-owned firms face discrimination in the regression for firms without a long relationship 
with the lender and Hispanic-owned firms face discrimination in the regression for large loans.  
The second specification issue concerns the possibility that underwriting standards differ 
for applications from different applicant pools. As explained earlier, this possibility complicates 
a test for discrimination. Variation in underwriting standards that accurately reflects differences 
in the factors associated with loan default that appear in different applicant pools can lead to a 
significant β coefficient even with no discrimination. To account for this possibility, we identify 
several variables that might be associated with different applicant pools and estimate split-
sample regressions based on these variables. To the extent that these variables accurately identify 
different applicant pools, these split-sample regressions estimate within-pool measures of 
discrimination, which cannot be influenced by legitimate across-pool variation in underwriting 
standards (Ross and Yinger 2002). 
Although they do not mention the issue of variation in underwriting standards, 
Blanchflower et al. (2003) provide split-sample results based on organization type (corporation 
and other) and on sales market (local compared to regional, national, or international), which can 
be interpreted as controls for different applicant pools. They find discrimination against black-
owned and Hispanic-owned businesses in the regressions for both types of sales market and in 
the regression for proprietorships and partnerships. They also find discrimination against black-
owned businesses in the corporation regression. 
We add two more versions of this test. The first, which we believe to be the most 
compelling, is to split the sample based on type of lender. After all, different types of lenders 
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specialize in different types of loan products and are very likely to draw on different applicant 
pools. In addition, we split the sample based on the industry of the applicant. Because each 
industry faces different economic circumstances, the factors leading to default could also differ 
by industry. As shown in Table 4, we find discrimination against black-owned and Hispanic-
owned businesses in both the service industry and the non-service industry regressions, as well 
as in the regression for commercial banks. The regression for other types of lenders indicates 
discrimination against black-owned but not against Hispanic-owned businesses. 
Overall, the conclusion that black-owned and Hispanic-owned businesses face 
discrimination in small business lending is not altered when we account for a variety of 
nonlinearities in underwriting standards or for the possibility that underwriting standards vary 
with the applicant pool.  
Selection Bias 
 We now turn to a test of whether the self selection of firm owners in applying for a loan 
biases the estimate of β. This form of bias arises when borrowers that choose to apply for credit 
are systematically different from those who choose not to apply. Bloom et al. (1983) argue that 
when lenders prescreen borrowers, the usual estimates of discrimination will be biased to the 
extent that the factors influencing the decision to apply are correlated with race/ethnicity but not 
observed by the researcher. They also develop a bivariate probit model to address this potential 
bias. As noted earlier, Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) estimate this model using the 1993 SSBF and find 
that it has little impact on estimates of discrimination.  
 We replicate the work of Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) using the 1998 SSBF. Our results are 
shown in Tables 5. We find that the βs estimated using a single-equation probit are not 
significantly different from those estimated using the bivariate probit. Moreover, the estimated 
correlation between the two equations is not statistically significant, which indicates that the 
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selection correction is not necessary. In addition, we find no significant differences across groups 
in the probability of applying for credit, all else equal. 
Interest Rates 
 Table 6 presents our analysis of interest rates on approved loans in 1998. Without 
controls, we find that businesses owned by blacks, Hispanics, and other races all face 
significantly higher interest rates, but these differences disappear once controls are added 
(Models 3 through 8).19 In the case of businesses owned by white women, we find no interest-
rate gap without controls, but find significantly lower interest rates in the regression with 
controls. On average, white women business owners obtain a 0.74 percentage point discount on 
their loan interest rate after controlling for creditworthiness and other factors.  
Because lenders may set interest rates and other loan terms simultaneously, we also 
determine whether our findings change when other loan terms are treated as endogenous. The 
challenge here is finding instrumental variables that are correlated with the other loan term but 
not with interest rates. We found suitable instruments for the loan amount approved,20 but only 
weak instruments for whether the loan had a fixed interest rate, whether the lender required 
collateral, whether the lender required a guarantor, and the points required at loan closing.21 The 
results for Model 9 in Table 6 show that controlling for endogeneity in loan terms has no effect 
on estimates of discrimination, but further research on this topic is needed, particularly with data 
sets that provide stronger instruments.22   
 Table 7 uses the split-sample technique to determine whether nonlinearities or differences 
in underwriting standards across loan applicant pools alter the findings of no interest-rate 
discrimination by race or ethnicity. Panel A of this table reveals that black-owned businesses 
pay, on average, a 1.12 percentage point interest rate premium for loans other than credit line 
loans, and that business owners of other races with low non-housing wealth may face 
discrimination by paying a 1.45 percentage point premiums more in interest. Interestingly, 
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relatively wealthy Hispanic business owners are found to receive favorable treatment in interest-
rate setting. Hispanics with over $75,000 in housing equity received a 1.26 percentage point 
discount, and those with non-housing wealth over $150,000 received a 1.04 percentage point 
discount, the latter of which being statistically significant only at the 10 percent level. Table 7 
also suggests that the apparent favoritism shown to white women business owners for lines of 
credit is nearly twice the favoritism for other loan types, but otherwise is limited to those with 
greater wealth, longer lender relationships, and those applying for smaller loans.   
 Accounting for possible differences in underwriting standards also matters. Table 7 
reveals that black-owned businesses encounter interest rate discrimination from non-commercial 
bank lenders, where they pay, on average, a 2.5 percentage point interest rate premium. This 
finding is significant only at the 10 percent level. Hispanic-owned and white-women-owned 
firms receive a 0.76 and 0.73 percentage point discount, respectively, in non-service related 
industries, while the white women favoritism shown above seems to be limited to commercial 
banks. Although discrimination in the setting of interest rates does not appear in Table 6, these 
split sample results suggest that it may nevertheless arise under some circumstances—a finding 
that is worthy of further exploration. 
The Causes of Discrimination 
A theory about the causes of discrimination identifies circumstances under which 
discrimination is more likely to occur. To test the hypothesis that discrimination is caused by 
lender prejudice, for example, we must identify variables associated with lender prejudice and 
see if they influence the estimate of discrimination. This test involves interacting these variables 
with the group membership variables and determining whether this interaction term is 
statistically significant with the expected sign.23 The problem, of course, is that variables clearly 
linked to lender prejudice or to statistical discrimination are difficult to identify. In this section 
we provide a preliminary look at the causes of discrimination by identifying a few variables that 
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might be linked to one of these hypotheses and determining whether they are statistically 
significant when interacted with group membership. 
The SSBF does not provide much information about lenders, but two variables indicate 
lender characteristics that might be associated with lender prejudice, namely whether the lender 
operates in the same location as the applicant and whether the lender has a long-term relationship 
with the applicant. Lenders who operate in the same location as black or Hispanic applicants or 
lenders who have a long-term relationship with a black or Hispanic applicant may be revealing a 
lack of prejudice. As shown in Table 8, one result supports this prediction, namely that 
discrimination against blacks is lower when the lender and applicant are located near each other. 
However, two other results work against this hypothesis: Hispanic-owned businesses encounter 
more discrimination when the lender is located in the same area, and black-owned businesses 
encounter more discrimination when they have a long-term relationship with the lender. These 
results therefore do not provide clear support for the hypothesis that agent prejudice is at work, 
but the variables we use may be poor indicators of lender prejudice. 
The precise form of statistical discrimination, if indeed it exists, is not well understood, 
but it seems plausible that it will involve stereotypes about the ability of applicants in certain 
groups to succeed if they have certain types of backgrounds or engage in certain kinds of 
business ventures. To look for hints of statistical discrimination, therefore, we interact group 
membership with a variety of firm characteristics. The results for these interaction terms in our 
loan-denial model (but not for all the other non-interacted variables from Table 3, which are also 
in this regression) are presented in Table 8. 
Only a few of these interaction terms are statistically significant, and only one of them is 
significant for more than one group. Strong indications of statistical discrimination operating the 
same way for different groups are not present here. The results for the national sales market 
variable provide perhaps the most intriguing hint. We find that both black-owned and white-
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women-owned businesses face more discrimination if they operate in a national market than if 
they operate in a local market. This suggests that lenders have a stereotype that these businesses 
will not succeed at the national level. A similar stereotype could explain the increase in 
discrimination against Hispanic-owned firms that operate in an international market. It may be 
worthwhile for future research to gather lender’s perceptions about the capabilities of firms 
owned by different groups.24 
Table 9 presents the results of interest-rate regressions with similar interaction terms. 
This table provides two particularly striking hints about the causes of discrimination.25 First, 
loans for capital leases involve less discrimination than other loans for blacks, other races, and 
white women. A capital lease protects a firm against obsolescence and may provide a signal that 
a firm is relatively sophisticated; if so, this signal may offset stereotypes that a lender has about 
businesses owned by certain groups and lower the interest-rate premium it requires these groups 
to pay. Second, we find clear evidence that discrimination is more likely when the lender is not a 
commercial bank. In the case of black-owned businesses, the three types of non-commercial 
banks identified in Table 9 are all more likely to discriminate. In the case of other races and 
white women, only finance companies are more likely to discriminate. This finding may reflect 
the fact that finance companies serve riskier borrowers than do commercial banks (Carey, Post, 
and Sharpe 1998) and are therefore more aggressive in using all information available, including 
group membership, to predict the probability of default. 
The SSBF data allow us to compare key credit, firm, and owner characteristics for 
borrowers that used finance companies with those that used commercial banks. On the one hand, 
the incidence of judgments for finance company borrowers is half that for commercial banks, 
and there are no significant differences on other credit measures. On the other hand, finance 
companies serve a significantly higher percent of low-sales firms, and lower percentages of firms 
with high owner experience levels and high owner wealth. Overall, this evidence on risk 
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differences between the applicant pools of commercial banks and finance companies is mixed, 
and the role of risk in explaining the higher interest rates charged to black firms by finance 
companies is worthy of further investigation. 
Finally, we estimate a split-sample regression based on the HHI variable to test the 
hypothesis that prejudice-based discrimination is higher in less competitive markets (see Table 
10). This approach, unlike the comparable tests in Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) and Cavalluzzo and 
Wolken (2002), accounts for the possibility that market concentration may affect many 
underwriting weights, not just discrimination. The hypothesis that discrimination is the same for 
loans in low-HHI areas and in high-HHI areas cannot be rejected for any group in either loan 
denial or interest rates. We find, for example, that, compared to white-owned firms, black-owned 
firms face a probability of loan denial that is 20.5 percentage points higher in low-HHI areas and 
21.0 percentage points higher in high-HHI areas. Both estimates are highly significant 
statistically. These results indicate either that discrimination is not motivated primarily by lender 
prejudice or that prejudice-based discrimination is not eliminated by competition—or both.  
Conclusion 
This paper adds to the growing literature on discrimination in small business credit 
markets by examining whether the methodological deficiencies identified in this literature have a 
significant impact on the estimation of discrimination. We first replicated the results in the most 
recent of these studies, and then proceeded to an analysis of whether omitted variables, 
misspecification, self selection, or endogeneity substantially altered the estimated coefficient of 
interest. We find substantial, statistically significant evidence of discrimination in loan denial 
against black-owned and Hispanic-owned businesses in 1998 with additional control variables, 
with a variety of different specifications, and with a simultaneous model of the application and 
loan-denial decisions. Moreover, we find that neither adding additional control variables nor 
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accounting for possible endogeneity alters the conclusion that no group faces discrimination in 
the setting of interest rates on approved business loans. We also find, however, that the 
specification of the interest-rate equation does matter. Black-owned businesses do face 
discrimination in interest rates, for example, when a separate interest-rate-setting model is 
estimated for lenders other than commercial banks. Discrimination in interest rates may therefore 
exist under some circumstances. 
These estimates are based on the best available data and methodology that have so far 
been identified, but they still have limitations. The SSBF may not contain some important 
underwriting variables and we may not have identified all the important specification issues in a 
loan-denial or interest-rate equation. Nevertheless, we believe that these results, along with those 
in previous articles on the subject, establish a strong presumption that black- and Hispanic-
owned businesses face discrimination in obtaining loans. These results also indicate that these 
businesses may, under some circumstances, face discrimination in the interest rates on loans they 
receive. We encourage other researchers to determine whether these conclusions hold up with 
alternative methods and alternative data sets. 
We also believe that this presumption of discrimination in loan denial should also be of 
great concern to the American public and to federal financial regulatory institutions. In a legal 
case against a lender who is alleged to have practiced discrimination, evidence of a higher denial 
rate for black- or Hispanic-owned businesses than for equally qualified white-male-owned 
businesses would establish a prima facie case that discrimination had taken place (FFIEC 
undated; Ross and Yinger 2002). It would then be up to the lender to prove that the remaining 
across-group differences in loan approval could be explained on the basis of legitimate business 
considerations. This logic can also be applied to a debate about the role of federal regulators. 
These regulators should re-double their efforts to uncover and prosecute lenders who 
discriminate against black- and Hispanic-owned businesses unless the regulators (or future 
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research) demonstrate that the results in this and previous studies can be explained by legitimate 
business factors that have so far been ignored. 
Finally, this study provides a preliminary investigation into possible causes of 
discrimination in small business lending. Our results do not provide clear evidence of a particular 
cause that operates across all groups, but we do find a few hints. In particular, we find some 
evidence consistent with the view that discrimination in small business lending may take the 
form of statistical discrimination, driven by lenders’ stereotypes about the ability of black- and 
Hispanic-owned businesses to succeed under some circumstances. In the case of loan-denial, we 
find significantly higher discrimination against black-owned businesses operating in the national 
market and for Hispanic-owned businesses operating in an international market. This result 
suggests that, in the view of lenders, black- and Hispanic-owned businesses operating outside a 
local market are more risky than white-owned businesses that operate in the same market and 
that have all the same observable credit characteristics. Acting on this belief is a form of 
statistical discrimination. In addition, discrimination in the setting of interest rates appears to be 
confined to some types of lenders, particularly finance companies. Because finance companies 
specialize in higher-risk borrowers, this finding might indicate that they are willing to consider 
group-membership as a risk predictor despite the illegality of this practice. 
Overall, existing research has paid little attention to the causes of discrimination in small 
business lending. We hope these hints will encourage research on this topic in the future.  
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Endnotes 
 
1. From 1997 to 2002, the number of black-, Hispanic-, Asian-, and women-owned firms 
grew by 45, 31, 24, and 20 percent, respectively. Over the same time, the respective sales 
receipts increased by 30, 22, 13, and 16 percent. By comparison, the total number of 
firms grew by 10 percent over this time period, with sales receipts overall increasing by 
22 percent. Nevertheless, in 2002 white male-owned firms took in over three times as 
many receipts per firm as minority- and white-women-owned firms. Source: 2002 Survey 
of Business Owners, Preliminary Estimates of Business Ownership, US Census Bureau, 
Company Statistics Division. 
 
2. FFIEC is an interagency organization that develops uniform principles, standards, and 
report forms for the various financial regulatory agencies. 
 
3. Note that, according to this nation’s fair lending laws, M cannot be included in π or in πE, 
even if it predicts loan profitability. A lender must base its decisions on applicants’ 
economic and financial characteristics, not on their membership in a particular 
racial/ethnic group or on their gender. As discussed by Ross and Yinger (2002), a 
correlation between M and profitability after controlling for other factors gives lenders an 
incentive to discriminate, but it does not give them the legal right to do so. 
 
4. In principle, the bias could work in either direction, but it seems likely that even 
legitimate variation in underwriting standards will have a disproportionately negative 
impact on groups with relatively poor credit credentials, especially minorities, so that the 
average disadvantage of minorities will be overstated when this variation is ignored. 
 
5. Some firms may not apply for a loan because they anticipate encountering discrimination. 
The SSBF asked survey respondents that did not apply for a loan why they did not apply, 
and some reported that they were afraid of being denied for reasons of prejudice. We 
return to this issue below. 
 
6. In the mortgage market, the range of products—and interest rates—has grown in recent 
years, and a few studies have investigated discrimination in mortgage interest rates 
(Courchane and Nickerson 1997; Crawford and Rosenblatt 1999). 
 
7. We do not include loan terms in the loan-denial model for both conceptual and practical 
reasons. Conceptually, our model assumes that a lender bases its estimate of profitability 
on the most profitable set of loan terms possible for each application. As a practical 
matter, we do not observe loan terms for denied loans.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27
 
8. A similar argument appears in the mortgage discrimination literature. See Munnell et al. 
(1996), Bostic (1996), and Hunter and Walker (1996). 
 
9. Some scholars have argued that a third cause, called cultural affinity, is also at work. See 
Calomiris, Kahn, and Longhofer (1994), Hunter and Walker (1996), and Longhofer 
(1996). Ross and Yinger (2002) show that all existing theories of cultural affinity reduce 
to either statistical discrimination or discrimination based on prejudice. 
 
10. Bostic and Lampani (1999) also include HHI in their regressions but do not interact it 
with group membership. 
 
11. A complete set of tables based on the 1993 SSBF data set is available from the authors 
upon request. 
 
12. Blanchflower et al. (2003) do not, however, include firms with ownership that is exactly 
50 percent non-Hispanic white female in the female-owned category. In fact, they 
dropped these firms from the analysis. 
 
13. It appears that in Blanchflower et al. (2003), these 83 firms were considered to have been 
denied loans in the loan denial analysis and to have been approved for loans in the 
interest rate analysis. 
 
14. Estimated coefficients for the full model can be found in Appendix A. 
  
15. In 1993, the regression with full controls indicates that black-owned businesses face 
significant discrimination, but the results are not significant for any other group. 
 
16. Blanchflower et al. (2003) include loan purpose variables, not lender type variables, but 
only in 1993. Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) control for loan purpose in their bivariate probit 
analysis controlling for selection, but not in their baseline model. 
 
17. Cavalluzzo et al. (2002), Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2002), and Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo 
(1998) include this relationship variable in their analyses of the denial decision. 
 
18. The following table indicates the share of the difference between our study and 
Blanchflower et al. (2003) that can be explained by various factors: 
 
  Black Hispanic 
Unexplained differences 18.75% 25.00% 
Use of mean marginal effect instead of marginal effect 
at the mean 
42.19% 57.35% 
Four additional sets of control variables 29.69% -27.94% 
Differences in group definitions -2.34% 25.00% 
Minor differences in sample and variable definitions 11.72% 20.59% 
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19. In 1993, the regression with full controls indicates no significant inter-group differences 
in interest rates. 
 
20. Since loan terms vary by industry and region, we first created industry by region dummy 
variables. For each of these 63 categories, we calculated different parts of the distribution 
(minimum to maximum) for firm, owner, and lender characteristics. We then ran a series 
of tests, including those suggested by Wooldridge (2003) and Hahn and Hausman (2002) 
(to ensure that the instruments are correlated with loan terms and not interest rates) and 
by Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) (to identify weak instruments). The following 
instruments identifying the loan amount approved passed these tests: the median length of 
firm relationship with its primary lender and the 10th percentile of firm inventory. 
 
21. The weak instruments include the following: average years of owner experience, 10th 
percentile of owner age, and the interaction of the previous two; 5th percentile of sales, 
10th percentile of housing equity, standard deviation of firm distance to lender, the 
interaction of the 25th percentile of sales with maximum firm assets; and the interaction 
of the 25th percentile of inventory with maximum employment. 
 
22. Moreover, none of the endogenous variables is significant. Because the collateral 
requirement variable was statistically significant in the expected negative direction when 
treated exogenously, we suspect that interest rates are set by lenders after collateral 
availability is determined. 
 
23. Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2002) also interact group membership with underwriting 
characteristics. Their purpose is not to study the causes of discrimination, but is, instead, 
to decompose inter-group differences in denial rates into two components, one 
representing differences in firm and owner characteristics across groups and the other 
representing differences in the treatment of borrowers in each group given these 
characteristics (i.e., discrimination). This approach leads to similar estimates of 
discrimination as the one used in this study and in most of the previous literature. This 
type of decomposition also appears in the literature on mortgage discrimination (Glennon 
and Stengel 1994; Munnell et al. 1996). 
 
24. Several of the other results in Table 8 are also intriguing, but given the exploratory nature 
of this regression, we do not wish to over-interpret them. Nevertheless, it might be useful 
for a future survey to determine whether lenders have stereotypes about black-owned 
businesses with prior delinquencies, about women who own small firms, or about the 
ability of various groups to succeed with various forms of firm organization. 
 
25. Table 9 also reveals that interest-rate discrimination often varies by industry. These 
results hint that lenders may act upon stereotypes about which groups are likely to 
succeed in which industries. This hint suggests that it might be fruitful to gather 
information on probabilities of success by group by industry or on related lender 
perceptions. 
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Table 1.  Variable Definitions 
 
Credit History  
Business delinquency whether the firm had delinquent business obligations in the past three years 
Personal delinquency whether the firm owner had delinquent personal obligations in the past three years 
Bankruptcy whether the firm or the owner declared bankruptcy in the past seven years 
Judgment whether there was judgment against the firm owner 
Credit Rating  
Low (moderate, significant, high) risk whether credit risk was low (moderate, significant, high)  according to the Dunn & Bradstreet credit score. 
The omitted category is average credit risk. 
Firm Characteristics  
Small (large) sales whether sales was less than $100,000 (greater than $2,000,000)  
 
Negative (large) profit whether profit was less than $0 (greater than $200,000) 
 
Negative (large) net worth whether net worth was less than $0 (greater than $500,000) 
 
Firm age the age of the firm 
Employment number of employees and owners 
Organization type whether the firm was sole proprietorship/c-corporation/other type. The omitted category is s-corporation. 
Regional (national, international) market whether the firm’s sales market was regional (national, international). The omitted category is local sales 
market. 
Industry fixed effects whether the firm was in mining or construction industry/transportation industry/ communications, electric, 
gas or sanitary industry/wholesale trade industry/ retail trade industry/finance, insurance or real estate 
industry. The omitted category is service industry. 
Owner Characteristics  
Education fixed effects whether the owner’s education level was high school dropout/high school graduate/some college/associate 
degree/ trade school/postgraduate degree. The omitted category is college degree. 
Short (long) business experience whether the owner had less than 5 years (greater than 25 years) business experience  
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Variable Definitions (cont.) 
 
Owner manage whether the owner made day-to-day management 
Small (large) housing wealth  whether the owner’s housing wealth was less than $20,000 (greater than $200,000)   
Small (large) non-housing wealth whether the owner’s non-housing wealth was less $20,000 (greater than $2,000,000) 
Loan Characteristics  
Small (large) loan whether the amount of loan requested was less than $10,000 (greater than $150,000) 
 
Purpose of loan whether the loan was capital lease/mortgage/vehicle loan/equipment loan/other type of loan. The omitted 
category is new line of credit 
Fixed-interest-rate loan whether the interest rate is fixed (for approved loans only) 
Collaterals required whether collaterals were required (for approved loans only) 
Type of collaterals whether inventory or accounts receivable/business securities or deposits/business real estate/personal real 
estate/other personal assets/other assets were used as collaterals (for approved loans only). The omitted 
category is equipment or vehicles used as collaterals. 
Guarantor required Whether a guarantor is required to co-sign on the loan (for approved loans only) 
Amount approved The loan amount approved by the lender (not always what is requested; for approved loans only) 
Points paid at closing The points (in interest percentage terms) paid at closing (for approved loans only) 
Lender Characteristics  
Type of lender Whether the lender was saving bank, loan association or credit union/finance company/ other type of 
institution or source. The omitted category is commercial bank. 
Same area with the borrower whether the lender was in the same area with the borrower 
Short (long) relation with the borrower whether the lender had less than 3 months (more than 3 years) business relationship with the borrower 
 
Geographic Variables  
Metropolitan area whether the firm was in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)  
Region fixed effects whether the firm was located in New England/Mid Atlantic/East North Central/West North Central/South 
Atlantic/East South Central/West South Central/Mountain region. The omitted category is Pacific region. 
 
 31
 
Table 2.  Selected Sample Means of the 1998 SSBF Data a 
 
 All White Men African 
American 
Hispanic Asian, Native 
American, and 
Pacific Islander 
White Women 
Full Sample of Small Business Firms       
Sample size 3561 2199 273 245 238 606 
Share of the full sample (%, unweighted) 100 61.75 7.67 6.88 6.68 17.02 
% Applied for a loan 23.33 24.48 25.76 25.76 20.90 19.20 
       
Sample of Loan Applications       
Sample size 879 566 71 67 49 126 
Treatment       
% Loan application denied 21.8 16.2 59.3 49.1 38.1 20.7 
Interest rate charged on approved loan (%) 9.257 9.227 9.862 10.099 10.499 8.883 
Credit History       
% Business delinquency  21.1 19.9 26.1 17.6 13.9 27.4 
% Personal delinquency  17.1 15.7 33.2 16.1 20.2 18.2 
% Bankruptcy 2.5 2.0 11.3 2.4 0.0 2.6 
% Judgments 6.2 5.9 13.0 4.0 9.9 5.2 
Credit Rating       
Low risk 6.1 7.5 0.0 6.9 1.4 2.8 
Moderate risk 27.3 29.5 14.8 23.1 29.0 23.1 
Average risk 33.9 32.9 41.6 29.3 39.6 36.0 
Significant risk 21.8 19.7 31.1 25.6 21.6 26.1 
High risk 10.9 10.3 12.5 15.1 8.4 11.9 
Firm Characteristics       
% Sales<$100,000 26.8 21.9 59.4 50.5 32.3 27.8 
% Sales>$2,000,000 13.1 16.2 3.1 4.1 10.2 7.5 
% Profit<=$0 20.4 18.4 22.6 22.6 21.9 26.1 
% Profit>$200,000 14.6 18.2 7.1 2.6 7.9 8.5 
% Net worth<=$0 29.6 28.0 33.4 19.8 27.5 38.3 
% Net worth>$500,000 9.2 11.3 1.0 1.1 7.6 6.3 
Firm age (years) 11.492 12.381 9.213 8.277 9.053 10.380 
Employment 11.835 13.289 6.784 8.151 12.948 8.593 
Owner Characteristics       
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% High school dropout 4.4 3.7 1.6 20.6 0.0 3.1 
% High school graduate 22.1 22.0 20.1 22.1 22.5 23.0 
% Some college 18.9 17.8 17.4 17.4 14.6 24.9 
% College 29.1 30.9 22.1 28.8 23.6 25.4 
% Postgraduate degree 17.5 17.4 14.6 7.4 37.0 17.4 
% Business experience<=5 years 12.9 11.3 14.8 19.3 15.8 15.5 
% Business experience>25 years 15.1 18.5 7.5 12.1 5.0 7.5 
% Housing wealth<=$20,000 25.6 21.0 28.2 38.8 50.1 31.8 
% Housing wealth>$200,000 14.2 16.3 5.6 6.7 10.5 11.9 
% Non-housing wealth<=$20,000 20.3 18.0 34.3 26.1 23.6 22.8 
% Non-housing wealth>$2,000,000 4.5 5.0 0.2 4.9 2.3 3.9 
Loan Characteristics       
% Loan<=$10,000 24.6 22.7 32.1 25.7 26.6 29.4 
% Loan>$150,000 16.3 18.1 4.6 13.1 21.5 12.3 
% Fixed interest rate loan 70.7 67.7 68.7 85.6 63.5 81.1 
% Collaterals required 56.8 61.0 50.3 43.0 55.0 44.4 
% Guarantor required 52.9 55.7 45.2 44.2 29.1 49.4 
Approved amount ($1,000) 182.4 184.3 57.0 71.6 243.0 204.6 
% Points paid at closing 14.5 14.1 32.8 7.4 12.5 15.6 
Lender Characteristics       
% Lender was commercial bank 69.3 68.8 79.7 72.0 69.1 67.5 
% Lender was saving bank, loan association or credit 
union 8.7 10.2 4.2 5.5 0.0 7.0 
% Lender was finance company 10.8 10.4 12.3 8.8 18.7 11.2 
% Lender was other type of institution  11.2 10.6 3.7 13.7 12.3 14.3 
% Lender in the same area with the firm 73.0 74.3 77.7 73.8 70.7 67.1 
% Lender’s relation with the firm<=3 months  31.0 28.0 36.1 45.1 24.1 37.8 
% Lender’s relation with the firm>3 years 43.1 45.7 46.0 30.5 42.1 37.0 
Note:  
a. The sample of loan applications only includes the firms that applied for a loan in the last three years. It does not include 83 firms that reported their loans were 
sometimes approved and sometimes denied. Sample weights are used to provide statistics.  
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Table 3.  Estimates of Discrimination in Loan Denial, 1998 SSBF Data a  
 
Specification (N=879) b African 
American 
Hispanic Asian, Native 
American, and 
Pacific Islander 
White Women Pseudo R2 
(1) None 0.431***   
(0.058) 
0.330***   
(0.061) 
0.145**    
(0.066) 
0.068* 
(0.041)   
0.102 
(2) Model 1 plus Credit History and Credit Rating 
 
0.298***    
 (0.058) 
0.283***      
(0.057) 
0.126**     
(0.059) 
0.045 
(0.036)    
0.264 
(3) Model 2 plus Firm Characteristics 
 
0.193*** 
   (0.051) 
0.197*** 
   (0.052) 
0.079    
(0.052) 
0.009 
(0.032) 
0.355 
(4) Model 3 plus Owner Characteristics 
 
0.203*** 
(0.052) 
0.185***   
(0.053) 
0.060 
(0.052) 
0.002 
  (0.031) 
0.367 
(5) Model 4 plus Loan Characteristics 
 
0.159*** 
(0.047) 
0.190*** 
(0.051) 
0.047 
(0.049) 
-0.000 
(0.031) 
0.418 
(6) Model 5 plus Lender Characteristics 
 
0.148*** 
(0.046) 
0.184*** 
(0.051) 
0.057 
   (0.049) 
-0.006 
   (0.030) 
0.445 
(7) Model 6 plus Geographic Variables 
 
0.144*** 
   (0.046) 
0.152***    
(0.049) 
0.039    
(0.048) 
-0.010 
   (0.030) 
0.459 
(8) Model 7 plus Application Year Fixed Effects 
 
0.173*** 
(0.049) 
0.147*** 
(0.049) 
0.037   
 (0.047) 
-0.003 
   (0.030) 
0.468 
Notes:  
a. This table reports mean of marginal effects from unweighted probit. The omitted racial/ethnic/gender group is white males. Estimated standard errors are in 
parentheses. * is significant at the 10% level. ** is significant at the 5% level. *** is significant at the 1% level. 
b. The final sample does not include 83 firms which reported their loans were sometimes approved and sometimes denied. Loan characteristics here do not 
include whether the interest rate was fixed, whether collaterals were required, and the type of collaterals. 
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Table 4.  Estimates of Discrimination in Loan Denial Based on Split Samples, 1998 SSBF Data a  
 
 African 
American 
Hispanic Asian, Native American, and 
Pacific Islander 
White Women Sample Size 
Panel A.  Nonlinearities in Underwriting Standards 
Firm Net Worth      
Net Worth<=$50,000 0.255*** 
(0.069) 
0.188*** 
(0.069) 
0.069 
(0.071) 
-0.038 
(0.046) 
432 
Net Worth>$50,000 0.078 
(0.065) 
0.179** 
(0.084) 
0.022 
(0.075) 
0.034 
(0.051) 
405 
Owner’s Housing Wealth      
Housing Wealth<=$75,000 0.163***    
(0.059) 
0.139**   
 (0.059) 
0.045    
(0.062) 
-0.050    
(0.047) 
422 
Housing Wealth>$75,000 0.218***    
(0.081) 
0.253**   
(0.100) 
-0.030    
(0.059) 
0.048    
(0.043) 
398 
Owner’s Non-Housing Wealth      
Non-Housing Wealth<=$150,000 0.188***     
(0.071) 
0.115*     
(0.065) 
0.020    
(0.079) 
-0.066    
(0.048) 
389 
Non-Housing Wealth>$150,000 0.231***     
(0.070) 
0.336***    
(0.096) 
0.059    
(0.055) 
0.037   
 (0.039) 
481 
Length of Relation with the Lender       
<=3 Years 0.111* 
(0.065) 
0.038 
(0.050) 
-0.048    
(0.053) 
-0.069*   
(0.036) 
432 
>3 Years 0.266***   
(0.079) 
0.243**    
(0.098) 
0.137    
(0.085) 
0.024    
(0.048) 
386 
Purpose of Loan      
New Line of Credit 0.148**     
(0.072) 
0.185**    
(0.093) 
0.116    
(0.100) 
0.014    
(0.066) 
287 
Other Purpose 0.263*** 
(0.089) 
0.161**    
(0.066) 
0.043   
(0.064) 
-0.027    
(0.034) 
568 
Loan Amount Requested      
Loan<=$50,000 0.204*** 
(0.069) 
0.226*** 
(0.071) 
0.129    
(0.085) 
-0.022    
(0.048) 
385 
Loan>$50,000 0.063    
(0.077) 
0.261**    
(0.110) 
0.034    
(0.060) 
-0.030    
(0.041) 
396 
 
 
Panel B: Variation in Underwriting Standards Across Applicant Pools 
Type of Lender      
Commercial Bank 0.181***    
(0.058) 
0.211***    
(0.065) 
0.062    
(0.063) 
0.043      
(0.040) 
622 
Other Type of Lender 0.162**    
(0.082) 
-0.046   
(0.070) 
-0.090    
(0.062) 
-0.165    
(0.016) 
246 
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Firm Industry      
Service Industry 0.291***     
(0.094) 
0.166**    
(0.084) 
0.027 
(0.078) 
-0.051    
(0.061) 
289 
Non-Service Industry 0.143**     
(0.057) 
0.139**    
(0.062) 
0.024   
 (0.068) 
0.000    
(0.033) 
563 
Note:  
a. This table reports mean of marginal effects from unweighted probit. The omitted racial/ethnic/gender group is white males. Estimated standard errors are in 
parentheses. Each row of this table represents a separate regression with the same control variables as Model (8). * is significant at the 10% level. ** is 
significant at the 5% level. *** is significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 5.  Comparing Estimated Coefficients from Probit and Bivariate Probit with Sample Selection, 1998 SSBF Data a 
 
 African American Hispanic Asian, Native 
American, and Pacific 
Islander 
White Women 
Probit (N=879)     
Denial b 0.975*** 
(0.241) 
0.846*** 
(0.247) 
0.242 
(0.296) 
-0.024 
(0.211) 
Bivariate Probit with Sample Selection (N=3,478)     
Denial b 0.997*** 
(0.233) 
0.828*** 
(0.246) 
0.203 
(0.292) 
-0.053 
(0.206) 
Apply c  0.116 
(0.099) 
0.074 
(0.101) 
-0.057 
(0.107) 
-0.062 
(0.072) 
Correlation between Estimation Equations 0.342 
(0.431) 
   
Notes: 
a. This table reports the estimated coefficients from unweighted probit and bivariate probit with sample selection. The omitted racial/ethnic/gender group is 
white males. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. * is significant at the 10% level. ** is significant at the 5% level. *** is significant at the 1% level. 
The final sample does not include 83 firms which reported their loans were sometimes approved and sometimes denied. 
b. The specification of the loan denial equation is the same as Model (8).  
c. In the application equation, the right-hand-side variables include credit history, credit rating, firm characteristics, owner characteristics, region fixed effects, 
and the number of institutions that the firm used for all financial services.  
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Table 6.  Estimates of Discrimination in Interest Rates Charged on Approved Loans, 1998 SSBF Data a  
 
Specification (N=713) b African American Hispanic Asian, Native 
American, and 
Pacific Islander 
White Women Adjusted R2 
(1) None 0.913**   
(0.401) 
0.734 **   
(0.381) 
0.780**    
(0.376) 
-0.170  
(0.244)  
0.013  
(2) Model 1 plus Credit History and Credit Rating 
 
0.784 **    
 (0.399) 
0.765 **     
(0.380) 
0.777**     
(0.373) 
-0.251 
(0.243) 
0.030 
(3) Model 2 plus Firm Characteristics 
 
0.492 
   (0.397) 
0.384 
   (0.375) 
0.682*    
(0.373) 
-0.486** 
(0.243) 
0.087 
(4) Model 3 plus Owner Characteristics 
 
0.493 
(0.398) 
0.239   
(0.379) 
0.544 
(0.377) 
-0.626*** 
  (0.244) 
0.108 
(5) Model 4 plus Loan Characteristics 
 
0.459 
(0.402) 
0.256 
(0.375) 
0.566 
(0.384) 
-0.737*** 
(0.243) 
0.144 
(6) Model 5 plus Lender Characteristics 
 
0.351 
(0.398) 
0.026 
(0.375) 
0.593 
   (0.380) 
-0.727***  
(0.241)   
0.165 
(7) Model 6 plus Geographic Variables 
 
0.454 
   (0.400) 
-0.135   
(0.377) 
0.524    
(0.381) 
-0.767*** 
(0.241)     
0.180 
(8) Model 7 plus Application Year and Month Fixed Effects 0.456 
(0.408) 
-0.188 
(0.379) 
0.384   
 (0.384) 
-0.773*** 
(0.244) 
0.184 
(9) Model 8 plus Endogenous Loan Characteristics c 0.560   
(0.439) 
-0.160  
(0.409) 
0.339   
(0.405) 
-0.727***  
(0.260) 
0.156 
Notes:  
a. With the exception of Model 9, this table reports the estimated coefficients from unweighted OLS. The omitted racial/ethnic group is white men. Estimated 
standard errors are in parentheses.  * is significant at the 10% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; and  *** is significant at the 1% level. 
b. The final sample does not include 83 firms which reported their loans were sometimes approved and sometimes denied.   
c. Model 9 was estimated using unweighted two-stage least squares (2SLS), treating the following loan characteristics as exogenous: the size of loan request, 
purpose of loan, whether it had a fixed interest rate, whether collateral was required, whether a guarantor was required, amount approved, and points paid at 
closing. Instruments varying across 63 industry by region categories include the following: average years of owner experience, 10th percentile of owner age, and 
the interaction of the previous two; 5th percentile of sales, 10th percentile of housing equity, standard deviation of firm distance to lender, median length of firm 
relationship with lender, and 10th percentile of inventory; the interaction of the 25th percentile of sales with maximum firm assets; and the interaction of the 25th 
percentile of inventory with maximum employment.  
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Table 7.  Estimates of Discrimination in Interest Rates on Approved Loans Based on Split Samples, 1998 SSBF Data a  
 
 African 
American 
Hispanic Asian, Native American, and 
Pacific Islander 
White Women Sample Size 
Panel A.  Nonlinearities in Underwriting Standards 
Firm Net Worth      
Net Worth<=$50,000 0.121 
(0.659) 
0.028 
(0.594) 
0.774 
(0.593) 
-0.533 
(0.395) 
332 
Net Worth>$50,000 0.660 
(0.553) 
-0.584 
(0.556) 
-0.310 
(0.577) 
-1.138*** 
(0.329) 
381 
Owner’s Housing Wealth      
Housing Wealth<=$75,000 0.811     
(0.608) 
0.657    
(0.588) 
0.491     
(0.578) 
-0.357    
(0.428) 
327 
Housing Wealth>$75,000 1.039    
(0.683) 
-1.262**     
(0.611) 
0.473   
(0.610) 
-0.949***    
(0.327) 
386 
Owner’s Non-Housing Wealth      
Non-Housing Wealth<=$150,000 0.633    
(0.716) 
0.400    
(0.643) 
1.456**    
(0.734) 
-0.666    
(0.505) 
277 
Non-Housing Wealth>$150,000 0.290     
(0.554) 
-1.045*    
(0.562) 
0.069     
(0.495) 
-0.967***     
(0.301) 
436 
Length of Relation with the Lender       
<=3 Years 0.338 
(0.610) 
0.389 
(0.508) 
0.882 
(0.621) 
-0.594 
(0.378) 
364 
>3 Years 0.754 
(0.643) 
-0.714 
(0.772) 
-0.392 
(0.549) 
-0.956*** 
(0.347) 
349 
Purpose of Loan      
New Line of Credit 0.996 
(0.748) 
0.822 
(0.846) 
1.661* 
(0.865) 
-1.097* 
(0.587) 
218 
Other Purpose 1.122** 
(0.571) 
-0.350 
(0.452) 
-0.082 
(0.454) 
-0.646** 
(0.276) 
495 
Loan Amount Requested      
Loan<=$50,000 0.191 
(0.659) 
-0.182 
(0.580) 
0.795 
(0.765) 
-1.062** 
(0.423) 
362 
Loan>$50,000 0.444 
(0.548) 
-0.283 
(0.531) 
-0.037 
(0.397) 
-0.289 
(0.294) 
351 
 
Panel B: Variation in Underwriting Standards Across Applicant Pools 
Type of Lender      
Commercial Bank -0.048 
(0.412) 
0.342 
(0.422) 
0.120 
(0.407) 
-0.913*** 
(0.261) 
507 
Other Type of Lender 2.559* 
(1.341) 
-0.239 
(1.025) 
1.320 
(1.096) 
-0.679 
(0.667) 
206 
Firm Industry      
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Service Industry 1.374 
(0.978) 
-0.201 
(0.800) 
0.784 
(0.682) 
-0.756 
(0.530) 
237 
Non-Service Industry 0.122 
(0.470) 
-0.757* 
(0.453) 
0.021 
(0.526) 
-0.728*** 
(0.281) 
476 
Note:  
a. This table reports estimated coefficients from unweighted OLS. The omitted racial/ethnic/gender group is white males. Estimated standard errors are in 
parentheses. Each row of this table represents a separate regression with the same control variables as Model (8). * is significant at the 10% level. ** is 
significant at the 5% level. *** is significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 8.  Estimated Coefficients on Interaction Variables from the Loan Denial Model (Probit), 1998 SSBF data a 
 
 African American Hispanic Asian, Native American, 
and Pacific Islander 
White Women 
Main Effect b 
 
0.191    
(1.153) 
-2.187    
(1.443) 
0.443    
(1.284) 
-1.564    
(1.117) 
Firm Characteristics     
Business Delinquency 
 
-1.779**   
 (0.728) 
0.627    
(0.935) 
-0.538    
(0.990) 
-0.092    
(0.635) 
Sales<$100,000 
 
0.333    
(0.737) 
0.379   
(0.782) 
-0.657    
(0.868) 
1.891**    
(0.842) 
Sales>$2,000,000 
 
-1.221    
(1.060) 
-0.519    
(1.161) 
_ 0.850   
(0.720) 
Proprietorship 
 
-0.061    
(0.759) 
-0.147   
(0.907) 
0.055    
(0.843) 
-2.059***    
(0.800) 
C-Corporation 
 
-0.735     
(0.963) 
0.329    
(1.051) 
0.602    
(1.390) 
-0.344    
(0.703) 
Other Type of Organization 
 
2.669*    
(1.536) 
0.951    
(1.595) 
-0.469    
(1.231) 
_ 
Regional Sales Market 
 
0.986   
(0.737) 
0.736    
(0.798) 
1.200    
(0.878) 
0.674    
(0.648) 
National Sales Market 
 
2.191*    
(1.324) 
-0.026    
(1.452) 
-0.497    
(1.013) 
2.189***   
 (0.788) 
International Sales Market 
 
1.003    
(1.641) 
3.375*    
(1.967) 
0.777    
(1.521) 
2.238    
(1.372) 
Lender Characteristics     
In the Same Area with the Firm 
 
-1.121*    
(0.672) 
2.372**    
(0.945) 
-0.377    
(0.872) 
0.945    
(0.777) 
Relation with the Firm<=3 Months  
 
0.736    
(0.942) 
0.686    
(0.852) 
0.079    
(1.081) 
0.577     
(0.817) 
Relation with the Firm>3 Years 
 
2.504**    
(0.994) 
0.679    
(0.844) 
0.637    
(0.998) 
0.549    
(0.747) 
Notes: 
a. This table reports the estimated coefficients on interaction variables between group membership variables and other selected explanatory variables. The 
specification is Model (8) plus the interaction variables listed above. The authors also experimented with adding other interaction variables and found they are 
not significant at the 5% level. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. * is significant at the 10% level. ** is significant at the 5% level. *** is significant 
at the 1% level. – means the variable is dropped because it predicts loan denial/approval perfectly. 
b. The first row reports the estimated coefficients for uninteracted group membership variables; in these models, this is no longer a measure of the average effect.  
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Table 9.  Estimated Coefficients on Interaction Variables from the Interest Rate Model (OLS), 1998 SSBF data a 
 
 African American Hispanic Asian, Native American, 
and Pacific Islander 
White Women 
Main Effect b 
 
-0.451    
(1.096) 
2.623**     
(1.213) 
-0.113 
(1.175) 
-1.861***     
(0.652) 
Firm Characteristics     
Net worth<=$0 
 
0.205 
  
(1.319) 
0.583   
(1.357) 
2.545** 
(1.024) 
0.888   
(0.576) 
Net worth>$500,000 
 
1.833   
(2.539) 
-0.590  
(2.067) 
2.200   
(1.614 ) 
0.278   
(0.781 ) 
Regional Sales Market 
 
0.917   
(1.259) 
-1.594   
(1.072) 
0.132   
(1.245 ) 
0.695   
(0.557 ) 
National Sales Market 
 
-0.359   
(2.136 ) 
0.442   
(1.849) 
-0.151   
(1.378) 
0.928   
(1.044) 
International Sales Market 
 
0.542   
(2.294 ) 
-1.316  
(4.557) 
0.177   
(2.419) 
-5.278*** 
(1.791)  
Mining or Construction industry 
 
-2.358   
1.821) 
-3.129** 
(1.533) 
-0.968   
(2.078) 
0.266   
(1.093 ) 
Transportation Industry 
 
-1.309   
(1.432) 
1.274   
(2.722 ) 
-1.127   
(1.684) 
0.973   
(0.972) 
Communications, Electric, Gas or 
Sanitary Industry 
_ -2.830*   
(1.562) 
-3.050*   
(1.832) 
2.599 **  
(1.026) 
Wholesale Trade Industry 
 
_ -0.960   
(1.813) 
-1.015   
(2.241) 
0.570   
(1.298) 
Retail Trade Industry 
 
0.216   
(1.345) 
-3.841**  
(1.760) 
0.581   
(1.622) 
0.079   
(0.626) 
Finance, Insurance or Real Estate 
Industry 
-1.019   
(2.214) 
-3.444   
(2.408) 
2.826   
(2.663) 
0.431   
(0.998) 
Loan Characteristics     
Loan<=$10,000 
 
0.973   
(1.467) 
-3.475**  
(1.621) 
2.407*   
(1.370) 
0.378   
(0.647) 
Loan>$150,000 
 
-0.004   
(1.357) 
-2.780*   
(1.667) 
-0.266   
(1.079) 
-1.380 *  
(0.729) 
Capital Lease 
 
-6.788**   
(2.860) 
0.984   
(2.271) 
-4.362**  
(1.880) 
-2.431*   
(1.317) 
Mortgage 
 
_ 0.067   
(1.864) 
-1.576   
(1.521) 
1.026   
(0.817) 
Vehicle Loan 
 
-6.684**  
(3.115) 
-1.102   
(2.015) 
-0.565   
(1.616) 
-1.124  
(0.815) 
Equipment Loan 
 
1.700   
(1.468) 
1.517   
(1.850 ) 
-3.658   
(2.714) 
1.339*   
(0.714) 
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Other Type of Loan 
 
0.786   
(1.341) 
3.440   
(2.603) 
-0.529  
(1.209) 
1.092   
(0.817) 
Lender Characteristics     
Saving Bank, Loan Association or 
Credit Union 
5.005*   
(2.669) 
3.459   
(2.864) 
_ 
 
0.510   
(0.929) 
Finance Company 
 
7.146***   
(2.609) 
-0.747  
(1.595) 
3.309*   
(1.918) 
1.427*   
(0.808) 
Other Type of Institution  
 
5.989**   
(2.388) 
0.308   
(1.801) 
0.698   
(1.299) 
0.195    
(0.755) 
Notes: 
a. This table reports the estimated coefficients on interaction variables between  group membership variables and other selected explanatory variables. The 
specification is Model (8) plus the interaction variables listed above. The authors also experimented with adding other interaction variables and found they are 
not significant at the 5% level. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. * is significant at the 10% level. ** is significant at the 5% level. *** is 
significant at the 1% level. – means the variable is dropped due to a lack of variation. 
b. The first row reports the estimated coefficients for uninteracted group membership variables; in these models, this is no longer a measure of the average effect. 
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Table 10. Estimates of Discrimination Based on Split Samples by Lender Competition, 1998 SSBF Data a  
 
 African 
American 
Hispanic Asian, Native American, and 
Pacific Islander 
White Women Sample Size 
Loan Denial      
HHI>=1800 0.210*** 
(0.081) 
0.100 
(0.072) 
0.087 
(0.073) 
-0.051 
(0.038) 
469 
HHI <1800 0.205*** 
(0.052) 
0.171*** 
(0.052) 
0.020 
(0.064) 
0.031 
(0.055) 
401 
Interest Rate      
HHI >=1800 0.710 
(0.639) 
0.011 
(0.553) 
0.563 
(0.602) 
-0.841*** 
(0.323) 
377 
HHI <1800 0.783 
(0.645) 
-0.147 
(0.594) 
0.620 
(0.578) 
-0.591 
(0.440) 
336 
Note:  
a. The first panel reports the estimated mean of marginal effects from unweighted probit and the second panel reports the estimated coefficients from 
unweighted OLS. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. Each row represents a separate regression with the same control variables as Model 
(8). * is significant at the 10% level. ** is significant at the 5% level. *** is significant at the 1% level. 
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Appendix A. Estimated Results for the Full Model of Loan Denial, Unweighted Probit, 1998 SSBF Data 
 
N=879 Mean of Marginal Effect Standard Error P Value 
African American  0.173  0.049  0.000  
Hispanic 0.147  0.049  0.003  
Asian, Native American, or Pacific Islander 0.037  0.047  0.437  
White women  -0.003  0.030  0.910  
Business delinquency 0.113  0.033  0.000  
Personal delinquency 0.118  0.037  0.001  
Bankruptcy 0.494  0.144  0.001  
Judgment 0.220  0.065  0.001  
Low credit risk -0.054  0.049  0.273  
Moderate credit risk -0.031  0.027  0.244  
Significant credit risk 0.001  0.027  0.963  
High credit risk -0.035  0.031  0.269  
Sales<$100,000 0.118  0.038  0.002  
Sales>$2,000,000 -0.080  0.037  0.033  
Profits<=0  -0.010  0.025  0.676  
Profits>$200,000  -0.016  0.035  0.645  
Firm net worth<=0 0.003  0.024  0.905  
Firm net worth>$500,000  0.016  0.045  0.724  
Firm age  -0.002  0.002  0.148  
Employment  -0.001  0.000  0.141  
Sole proprietorship 0.011  0.029  0.695  
C-corporation 0.010  0.031  0.746  
Other type of organization 0.046  0.044  0.292  
Regional sales market  -0.018  0.025  0.465  
National sales market  0.057  0.041  0.163  
International sales market  0.036  0.049  0.473  
Mining or construction industry 0.002  0.034  0.964  
Transportation industry -0.009  0.038  0.816  
Communications, electric, gas or sanitary industry -0.104  0.035  0.003  
Wholesale trade industry -0.091  0.038  0.018  
Retail trade industry -0.008  0.028  0.768  
Finance, insurance or real estate industry -0.084  0.038  0.028  
High school dropout 0.060  0.063  0.342  
High school graduate 0.035  0.035  0.325  
Some college 0.035  0.036  0.324  
Associate degree -0.041  0.042  0.334  
Trade school -0.034  0.048  0.479  
Postgraduate degree 0.013  0.031  0.686  
Owner manage  -0.093  0.039  0.017  
Business experience<5 years  0.002  0.033  0.963  
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Business experience>25 years -0.033  0.034  0.328  
Owner’s housing wealth<$20,000  0.053  0.028  0.060  
Owner’s housing wealth>$200,000  -0.012  0.033  0.717  
Owner’s non-housing wealth<$20,000  -0.030  0.025  0.225  
Owner’s non-housing wealth>$2,000,000 -0.001  0.052  0.983  
Loan requested<=$10,000 -0.067  0.024  0.005  
Loan requested>$150,000 0.021  0.032  0.520  
Capital lease loan -0.029  0.046  0.532  
Mortgage loan -0.070  0.029  0.017  
Vehicle loan -0.146  0.023  0.000  
Equipment loan -0.106  0.025  0.000  
Other type of loan -0.023  0.027  0.394  
Saving bank, loan association or credit union 0.008  0.050  0.879  
Finance company -0.025  0.041  0.539  
Other type of institution or source 0.033  0.041  0.427  
Lender and borrower in the same area 0.085  0.025  0.001  
Relationship between lender and borrower<3 months 0.058  0.032  0.074  
Relationship between lender and borrower>3 years 0.086  0.029  0.003  
MSA fixed effect 0.011  0.025  0.650  
New England 0.013  0.061  0.828  
Mid Atlantic 0.022  0.039  0.576  
East North Central -0.053  0.036  0.141  
West North Central -0.056  0.042  0.181  
South Atlantic -0.025  0.032  0.439  
East South Central -0.103  0.036  0.004  
West South Central 0.009  0.036  0.795  
Mountain region 0.012  0.041  0.768  
Year 1996  -0.054  0.041  0.193  
Year 1997  -0.076  0.026  0.003  
Year 1998 -0.033  0.023  0.164  
Year 2000 -0.005  0.043  0.899  
Pseudo R2 0.468    
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Appendix B. Estimated Results for the Full Model of Interest Rates, Unweighted OLS, 1998 SSBF Data 
 
N=713 Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
African American  0.456  0.408  0.264  
Hispanic -0.188  0.379  0.619  
Asian, Native American, or Pacific Islander 0.384  0.384  0.319  
White women  -0.773  0.244  0.002  
Business delinquency 0.173  0.238  0.467  
Personal delinquency 0.337  0.318  0.290  
Bankruptcy -0.132  1.569  0.933  
Judgment 0.082  0.598  0.892  
Low credit risk 0.060  0.325  0.853  
Moderate credit risk -0.201  0.216  0.353  
Significant credit risk -0.202  0.230  0.380  
High credit risk 0.193  0.310  0.534  
Sales<$100,000 -0.481  0.294  0.103  
Sales>$2,000,000 -0.284  0.256  0.267  
Profits<=0  0.185  0.235  0.431  
Profits>$200,000  -0.115  0.233  0.622  
Firm net worth<=0 -0.094  0.210  0.655  
Firm net worth>$500,000  -0.268  0.267  0.316  
Firm age  -0.013  0.010  0.168  
Employment  -0.002  0.002  0.261  
Sole proprietorship 0.297  0.252  0.241  
C-corporation 0.168  0.209  0.422  
Other type of organization -0.427  0.329  0.196  
Regional sales market  0.423  0.197  0.033  
National sales market  0.174  0.294  0.554  
International sales market  -0.054  0.380  0.887  
Mining or construction industry 0.188  0.289  0.516  
Transportation industry -0.145  0.289  0.617  
Communications, electric, gas or sanitary industry -0.121  0.370  0.744  
Wholesale trade industry -0.215  0.331  0.517  
Retail trade industry -0.057  0.253  0.822  
Finance, insurance or real estate industry 0.170  0.392  0.664  
High school dropout 0.960  0.520  0.065  
High school graduate -0.053  0.250  0.833  
Some college 0.249  0.253  0.325  
Associate degree 0.099  0.401  0.804  
Trade school -0.440  0.543  0.418  
Postgraduate degree -0.131  0.243  0.589  
Owner manage  -0.307  0.255  0.229  
Business experience<5 years  0.715  0.322  0.027  
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Business experience>25 years -0.022  0.236  0.925  
Owner’s housing wealth<$20,000  0.646  0.232  0.006  
Owner’s housing wealth>$200,000  0.054  0.217  0.803  
Owner’s non-housing wealth<$20,000  0.183  0.270  0.498  
Owner’s non-housing wealth>$2,000,000 -0.307  0.289  0.290  
Loan requested<=$10,000 1.096  0.270  0.000  
Loan requested>$150,000 -0.180  0.239  0.451  
Capital lease loan 0.478  0.430  0.267  
Mortgage loan -0.324  0.359  0.367  
Vehicle loan -0.572  0.301  0.058  
Equipment loan 0.165  0.274  0.547  
Other type of loan 0.219  0.276  0.427  
Fixed interest rate -0.189  0.205  0.357  
Collaterals required -0.321  0.220  0.145  
Inventory or accounts receivable used as collaterals 0.001  0.301  0.997  
Business securities or deposits used as collaterals 0.170  0.509  0.739  
Business real estate used as collaterals -0.063  0.324  0.845  
Personal real estate used as collaterals 0.274  0.361  0.447  
Other personal assets used as collaterals -0.288  0.380  0.448  
Other assets used as collaterals -0.328  0.464  0.480  
Saving bank, loan association or credit union -0.646  0.348  0.063  
Finance company 0.402  0.317  0.205  
Other type of institution or source -0.133  0.303  0.662  
Lender and borrower in the same area 0.083  0.216  0.700  
Relationship between lender and borrower<3 months 0.608  0.237  0.011  
Relationship between lender and borrower>3 years -0.048  0.214  0.823  
MSA fixed effect -0.106  0.196  0.589  
New England 0.272  0.449  0.545  
Mid Atlantic 0.002  0.323  0.994  
East North Central -0.510  0.309  0.100  
West North Central -0.616  0.342  0.072  
South Atlantic -0.751  0.281  0.008  
East South Central -0.894  0.384  0.020  
West South Central 0.153  0.312  0.624  
Mountain region 0.085  0.357  0.811  
Year 1996  0.213  0.399  0.593  
Year 1997  -0.099  0.248  0.690  
Year 1998 -0.197  0.192  0.304  
Year 2000 0.412  0.415  0.321  
January -0.247  0.376  0.511  
February -0.287  0.379  0.450  
March 0.393  0.387  0.310  
April -0.399  0.376  0.290  
May -0.730  0.401  0.069  
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June 0.277  0.398  0.487  
July -0.216  0.369  0.558  
August 0.250  0.357  0.483  
September -0.249  0.380  0.512  
October 0.225  0.375  0.548  
November 0.277  0.357  0.439  
December 9.933  0.586  0.000  
Constant 0.456  0.408  0.264  
Adjusted R2 0.184   
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